A social dilemma appears when defection is individually favored than cooperation although the latter is collectively optimal. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner's dilemma [Yi et al., J. Theor. Biol. (2017)] and for the three-person iterated public goods game [Murase and Baek, J. Theor. Biol. (2018)]. A successful strategy forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of implementation error while assuring that the long-term payoff never becomes less than the co-players' regardless of their strategies, when the error rate is small. Although we have a list of actions prescribed by the successful strategies, the rationale behind them have not been fully understood. In this paper, we wish to provide a better understanding for the successful strategies by converting them into equivalent automata with a minimal number of states. Each of the states becomes interpretable in this representation, whereby one can gain insight into the underlying mechanism.
Introduction
George Berkeley says that a man who believes in no future state has no reason to postpone his own private interest or pleasure to doing his duty (Chalmers, 2008) . Reciprocity is one way to establish cooperation between rational individuals under this shadow of future (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010; Van Veelen et al., 2012) . Tit-for-tat (TFT) is one of the most popular reciprocal strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD) game (Axelrod, 1984) . Just by replicating the co-player's previous action, it embodies several, intuitively appealing properties, that is, being clear, nice, provokable, and forgiving. However, in the presence of implementation error, two TFT players easily run into TFT retaliation (Molander, 1985; Boyd, 1989) , so the long-run average payoff becomes as low as those between two RANDOM players, where a RANDOM strategy means choosing cooperation with probability 1/2. Moreover, a TFT population is invaded by unconditional cooperators because a TFT player cannot distinguish an unconditional cooperator from another TFT player. Generous TFT has been suggested to avoid the TFT retaliation (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992; Imhof et al., 2005 Imhof et al., , 2007 Imhof and Nowak, 2009 ), but it is outperformed by Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) (Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) . WSLS also solves the problem of distinguishability in the sense that it earns a strictly higher average payoff against an unconditional cooperator. However, it is vulnerable against unconditional defectors.
A notable progress in the iterated PD game is the discovery of the zerodeterminant (ZD) strategies (Press and Dyson, 2012) . Each of them is a memory-one strategy, generally stochastic, and it can enforce a certain linear relationship between its own payoff and co-players' payoffs irrespective of the co-player's strategy Ichinose and Masuda (2018) ; Mamiya and Ichinose (2019) . This is true even when the co-player has a longer memory or when the strategy is known to the others. When both the players attempt to extort each other using an extortionate ZD strategy, they end up with mutual defection, so an extortionate strategy is hard to evolve as a group (Hilbe et al., 2013a; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013; Hilbe et al., 2013b; Szolnoki and Perc, 2014) . TFT is a special case of the ZD strategies, equalizing the players' payoffs in the long run.
An even stronger class of strategies have been explored in Yi et al. (2017) . They have proposed a strategy called TFT-anti-TFT (TFT-ATFT), which can be understood as a modification of TFT. It has been devised to remedy the problems of TFT by satisfying the following three criteria: 1. Efficiency: If all the players in the game have adopted this strategy in common, they will reach mutual cooperation with probability one as the implementation error rate e approaches zero. 2. Defensibility: If the focal player uses this strategy, her expected payoff is greater than or equal to any of her co-players' regardless of their strategies. 3. Distinguishability: If all the co-players are unconditional cooperators, the expected payoff from this strategy is strictly higher than theirs.
The class of strategies satisfying these three criteria are called successful hereafter. The first two criteria are especially important because a cooperative Nash equilibrium is formed when efficiency and defensibility conditions are simultaneously satisfied (Yi et al., 2017) . Moreover, it is guaranteed that the focal player's long-term payoff is never be less than those of the others against any kind of strategies including irrational ones. Just as is the case for the ZD strategies, this relation is assured even when the co-players have a longer memory length or when they know the focal player's deterministic strategy. TFT-ATFT is a memory-two strategy, namely, it prescribes its next action depending on the history profile for previous two rounds. As indicated by the name, it is a combination of TFT and anti-TFT: It usually copies its co-player's action at the last round as if it is a TFT player while it takes the opposite actions when the focal player committed an error. Due to the "plan B", which is executed after its own error, mutual cooperation is tolerant against error while assuring the defensibility. Regarding efficiency, we mention that perception error can also be corrected if it occurs with a much longer time scale than implementation errors (Yi et al., 2017) . Successful strategies exist not only for the iterated PD game but also for an iterated public goods (PG) game (Boyd and Richerson, 1988) . The payoff matrix of the three-person PG game is given as follows:
where the number of defectors among the two co-players is written at the top of each column , and ρ is a multiplication factor satisfying 1 < ρ < 3. This is a generalization of the iterated PD game to a three-person case. As in the PD game, the only Nash equilibrium of the one-shot PG game is full defection with payoff M D,2 = 1, which is the worst for the society as a whole. For the iterated three-person PG game, it has been found that there are at least 256 successful strategies in the memory-three strategy space (Murase and Baek, 2018) and that there is no such strategy if the memory length is less than three. This fact immediately poses a problem on its understandability: Recall that a memory-three strategy is defined by an action table having 512 entries because the number of possible history profiles is 2 3×3 = 512. The purpose of this paper is to interpret the successful strategies by representing them as equivalent automata. In the previous works, we have represented successful strategies in a "history-based" manner so that the next action is given as a function of the history profile for the last m rounds. However, a strategy may also be defined as an automaton (Rubinstein, 1986) , i.e., a player has a finite number of internal states. A player's internal state determines her next action, and it changes according to the actions taken by the players of the game. We will show that the decision mechanism behind the actions prescribed by the strategy can be understood more clearly in this 'state-based' representation.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present an algorithm to convert a history-based representation to a state-based one, and its applications to some successful strategies are demonstrated in Section 3. We discuss possible interpretations for the resulting internal states and summarize this work in the last section.
Method
In this section, we show how a history-based strategy can be converted to a state-based representation. In general, history-based strategies may be regarded as a subset of state-based ones because one may also regard the history profile over the previous m rounds as an internal state. In this naive reinterpretation, the number of states (i.e., history profiles) would amount to 2 nm , where n is the number of players. Let us consider a directed graph with 2 nm nodes, in which each node denotes a distinct history profile and each link means a transition between a pair of states. Each node has 2 n−1 outgoing links, corresponding to the possible number of actions taken by the n − 1 co-players, because the focal player's action has already been fixed by the strategy under consideration. Note that this graph does not include transitions caused by implementation error.
An example of such a graph is shown in Fig. 1(a) . Because TFT is a memory-one strategy for a two-players game, it has four nodes, labeled by cc, cd, dc, and dd, respectively. Suppose that the current history profile is cc. For example, if the two players' last actions are c and d, respectively, the next history profile becomes cd. In case of TFT, the action tuples such as cd, denoted as link attributes, happen to look similar to node labels, but this is not the case for general memory-m strategies if m > 1. Although this representation fully define the strategy, it is redundant. For instance, it is obvious that TFT can also be represented by a graph with two states as shown in Fig. 1(b) . In case of TFT, it is straightforward to construct the graph in Fig. 1 (b) based on Fig. 1(a) . However, it suddenly becomes complicated when the memory length gets longer because the number of nodes grows exponentially.
Thus, the question is how to simplify a naive representation systematically by minimizing the number of states. This is known as deterministicfinite-automaton (DFA) minimization in automata theory (Moore, 1956) . Specifically, we use the following algorithm:
1. Split given states into two partitions P 0 . Each of them consists of states at which c and d are prescribed, respectively. 2. Initialize k = 0. 3. Increment k. For each partitions in P k−1 , divide them into a finer set of partitions P k if a pair of nodes i and j are not equivalent. Here, nodes i and j are equivalent if the outgoing links from these nodes go to the same partition in P k−1 for any input. In our context, an input means an action tuple of the co-players. (see Fig. 2 .) 4. Repeat step 3 until P k becomes identical to P k−1 .
In short, we regard two states as identical when they lead to the same future. The final result is uniquely determined irrespective of the order of choosing node pairs. If we apply this algorithm to Fig. 1(a) for instance, it ends up with two super-nodes {cc, dc} and {cd, dd}, yielding the graph shown in Fig. 1(b) as expected. The opposite conversion is not always possible. For example, one needs an infinitely long memory to describe the behavior of Contrite TFT (CTFT) (Sugden, 1986) in the history-based representation (Boerlijst et al., 1997) , whereas its state-based version needs only four states [ Fig. 1 Figure 1 : (a) Transition among history profiles of TFT. Each node is labeled by a history file, which is a 2-tuple composed of the last actions of the two players in this memoryone strategy. A history profile may also be regarded as an internal state of the focal player in this naive representation. Each node has two outgoing links because it has two possible destinations depending on the co-player's choice between c and d. (b) State-based representation of TFT with two two internal states. If the co-player cooperates (defects), the internal state becomes 1(0), and the focal player chooses an action based on this state. The color of each node indicates the action prescribed at each state: Blue and red mean cooperation and defection, respectively. (c) Graph representation of CTFT, one of the most well-known strategies based on internal states called standing. Each player's standing is either good (0) or bad (1) from the focal player's viewpoint. For example, '10' means that the focal player assigns good standing to herself and bad standing to her co-player. TF2T (after) AON2 (before) AON2 (after) Figure 3 : Conversion of history-based representation to state-based one. An example is Tit-for-Two-Tats (TF2T) before and after the DFA minimization (left). The second example on the right hand is AON 2 , the 'all-or-none' strategy for the PG game among memory-two players, proposed by Hilbe et al. (2017) . Each of these strategies, which generally has 16 nodes as a memory-two strategy, is reduced to an automaton with three internal states by the DFA minimization. As in Fig. 1, blue (red) means that the player should cooperate (defect) at the state. We have suppressed the action tuples assigned to the links in the history-based representation for better visibility.
Result

Iterated PD game
Let us consider the iterated PD game between two players, say, Alice and Bob. We assume that Alice has adopted TFT-ATFT, and its historybased representation is shown in Fig. 4(a) . The label of each node is the history profile by Alice and Bob over the two previous rounds, denoted as A t−2 A t−1 B t−2 B t−1 , where A t and B t mean Alice's and Bob's actions at time t, respectively. This graph shows every possible transition among the history profiles in the absence of the implementation errors when Alice is a TFT-ATFT player.
Alice normally behaves as a TFT player, and this behavior is described by the strongly connected component indicated by the green dashed rectangle in Fig. 4(a) . However, when she erroneously defects from mutual cooperation, she switches her behavior to ATFT. The history profile jumps from cccc to cdcc by this error, and then Alice should defect once again as an ATFT player. If both use TFT-ATFT, they quickly recover mutual cooperation without being exposed to the risk of exploitation via the following sequence of history profiles: cdcc → ddcd → dcdd → ccdc → cccc. Figure 5 : Two representations of one of the PS2's for the iterated three-person PG game. (a) History-based representation. As a memory-two strategy for a three-person game, it has 2 6 = 64 nodes, each of which has four outgoing links. (b) State-based representation. As in Fig. 4(b) , the color of each node indicates which action should be chosen between c and d at the corresponding internal state.
The DFA minimization algorithm simplifies the graph to a great extent as shown in Fig. 4(b) . It has only four internal states which we have labeled '4', '5', '0', and '1', respectively. It is the latter two, '0' and '1' that describe the TFT behavior, as we have already seen in Fig. 1 . When Alice erroneously defects from mutual cooperation, on the other hand, the state jumps to '4', which belongs to the ATFT part. If both Alice and Bob are TFT-ATFT players, they can safely recover the mutual cooperation at state '0' via '5'. The transition from '5' to '0' is crucial because Alice thereby accepts Bob's punishment.
Iterated three-person PG game 3.2.1. Partially successful strategies
Now, let us proceed to the iterated three-person PG game among Alice, Bob, and Charlie. It has been proved for this game that successful strategies are possible only when the memory length is greater than two. However, it is instructive to begin with partially successful strategies (PS2) (Murase and Baek, 2018) , which are memory-two strategies with defensibility, distinguishability, and partial efficiency. By partial efficiency, we mean that the players achieve mutual cooperation with nonzero probability < 100% in the limit of e → 0 + . For example, TFT is partially efficient.
By enumerating all the possible memory-two strategies, whose number is greater than one trillion, we have discovered 256 PS2's. Figure 5 shows one of them before and after the minimization. The history-based representation needs 64 nodes, which makes it difficult to interpret how the strategy works by visual inspection [Fig. 5(a) ]. On the other hand, its state-based representation needs only 6 nodes as demonstrated in Fig. 5(b) . Of course, some variations exist among PS2's, and the numbers of their internal states are between 6 and 8, but their overall structures are similar.
We can interpret the nodes in Fig. 5(b) , representing the internal states of this PS2, in the following way: Suppose that Alice is using this PS2. The node labeled '0' means 'full trust', and Alice can expect full cooperation if this is her internal state. If one of her co-players, say Bob, defects from full cooperation, Alice's state moves to '4', and her strategy prescribes defection at this state. The meaning is obvious: She distrusts Bob. Cooperation can nevertheless be recovered if Bob chooses c whereas the other two players punish him by d, whereby Alice's internal state becomes 'full trust' again. Another state labeled '1' can be interpreted in the same way, and the only difference is that this time it is Charlie who defects from full cooperation. If both Bob and Charlie defect from full cooperation, Alice's internal state changes to '5', which lies at the the bottom of Fig. 5(b) . It means that she is in despair because they may be trapped in mutual defection.
So far, we have explained how we can interpret '0', '1', '4', and '5' in Fig. 5(b) . The interesting part is the other two states labeled '16' and '18'. The former one, '16', corresponds to A t−2 A t−1 B t−2 B t−1 C t−2 C t−1 = cdcccc, which is possible when Alice defects erroneously from full cooperation. She has to choose c at this state, and she can go back to '0' by accepting defection from Bob or Charlie. In plain words, therefore, we could say that Alice wants to make an apology at this state. Similarly to TFT-ATFT, this apology plays an important role in maintaining mutual cooperation in a noisy environment.
Alice can also visit '16' from '18' with a link of dcc. It is this state '18' that makes it possible for Alice to provoke her co-players and test their naivety: The loop between '16' and '18' implies that Alice can exploit Bob and Charlie by alternating provocation (d) and apology (c) if they are unconditional cooperators. This loop thus provides distinguishability for her PS2.
Fully successful strategies
By modifying the 256 PS2's, we have reported the same number of fully successful strategies in the memory-three strategy space (Murase and Baek, 2018) . Their key difference from PS2's is that they achieve full cooperation with probability 100% in the limit of e → 0 + . To stress the difference, we Figure 6 : DFA minimization result of a fully successful strategy. The labels and the colors are given in the same way as in Fig. 4(b) .
will call them fully successful strategies (FUSS's). The DFA minimization process converts the FUSS's to automata with 10 ∼ 14 internal states. One of the simplest is depicted in Fig. 6 . Its similarity to Fig. 5(b) is striking, and we can immediately recognize the states for full trust ('0'), despair ('0'), apology ('64'), and provocation ('66'). At the same time, some of its features are different from the above PS2: First, this FUSS makes Alice more careful in distrusting one of her co-players. Recall that we have interpreted state '4' as expressing Alice's distrustfulness of Bob. It is now split into '8' and '76'. Due to this split, it takes one more step to despair when one of the co-players defects. It means that the following recovery path is possible even if Bob defects twice in a row:
whereas the same sequence of actions would only lead to Alice's distrustfulness of Charlie for the PS2 shown in Fig. 5(b) :
The second difference is the appearance of '72' and '65', which have no equivalents in Fig. 5(b are reachable only by error. For example, node '72' represents a history profile
in binary, which means that Alice and Bob erroneously defected at the previous round. In fact, these additional four states are needed to make this strategy tolerant against two-bit error, which is a necessary condition for full efficiency in this three-person game (Murase and Baek, 2018) . When Alice, Bob, and Charlie have adopted this FUSS in common, we can show that the players recover cooperation from every possible type of one-and two-bit error by enumerating all the possible cases:
1. Suppose that one of the FUSS players, say, Bob, committed an error. If s i denotes player i's internal state (see Fig. 6 ), we will have (s A , s B , s C ) = (8, 64, 1), where Alice, Bob, and Charlie are abbreviated to A, B, and C, respectively. It means that Bob will make an apology ('64') by accepting punishment from Alice and Charlie. This recovers cooperation as every player goes back to full trust ('0'). 2. The FUSS can also correct two-bit error, which has three possibilities:
(a) One player, say, Bob, commits error twice in a row. (b) Bob commits an error, and so does Charlie at the next round.
(c) Two players, say, Bob and Charlie, commit error simultaneously.
Now, we will show that all these three types of two-bit error are corrected by the FUSS: (a) We have already seen from Eq.
(2) that this FUSS allows a recovery path along which s A changes as 0 → 8 → 76 → 0. The question is whether the co-players' strategic interactions do not interrupt such a path when they are using the same FUSS. In Fig. 7, we 
for this type of two-bit error. The error is corrected. (b) In the second case, Bob first defects in error from full cooperation. Charlie is supposed to punish Bob by choosing d at the next round, but he mistakenly chooses c instead. Up to this point, the players' internal states have evolved as (s A , s B , s C ) = (0, 0, 0) → (8, 64, 1) → (66, 0, 0). Considering that state '66' has been interpreted as a decision to provoke the co-players, we see that Charlie, after the mistaken c, appears to Alice as an unconditional cooperator. After provoking Bob and Charlie by choosing d, Alice wants to make an apology, and Bob and Charlie want to punish her provocation. Their internal states thus correspond to (64, 1, 8) . Understanding that Bob and Charlie are not unconditional cooperators, Alice accepts their punishment, whereby everyone returns to the full-trust state, i.e., (s A , s B , s C ) = (0, 0, 0). The recovery path is summarized as follows: (6) (c) For the third case, we have already considered such simultaneous twobit error in Eq. (4). Alice falls into despair ('9') after Bob and Charlie's simultaneous defection from full cooperation, and their states are given as (9, 72, 65) . Bob and Charlie recognize their error and decide to cooperate due to the existence of '72' and '65'. Alice tests them at (66, 0, 0), but we already know that this (66, 0, 0) ends up with full trust [see Eq. (6)]. The whole recovery path is thus given as follows: 
(7)
Although c is prescribed by this FUSS at those newly added states, '72' and '65', it does not violate the defensibility criterion because the states are accessible only by its player's error, not by the co-players' intention.
To sum up, the FUSS in Fig. 6 corrects every possible type of one-and two-bit error and therefore exhibits full efficiency. All the recovery paths discussed above are depicted together in Fig. 7 .
Summary and discussion
In summary, we have investigated the working mechanism of successful strategies for two-and three-person social dilemmas by converting them from history-based representation to state-based one through the DFA minimization. The state-based representation suggests how a player's internal state should interact with observed actions to make the strategy successful. Such understanding has enormous importance because the essential features of the two-and three-person cases will extend to the general n-person social dilemma as well.
It is worth noting that state-based representation is closely related to the idea of indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004; Brandt and Sigmund, 2005; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006; Takeuchi et al., 2007; Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Nax et al., 2015) . Similarly to the internal states in this work, indirect reciprocity has the notion of reputation: Alice's action is decided in reference to all the players' reputations, and her reputation is updated depending on her action and the players' previous reputations. Such apparent similarity suggests a fascinating possibility that a successful social norm for a game of indirect reciprocity may be constructed based on a successful strategy for a game of direct reciprocity. This approach may be computationally advantageous, especially if we consider that the number of possibilities grows drastically as the number of states increases. For example, we have found a successful strategy with 10 internal states, but it would have been extremely hard if we had begun with navigating the huge possibilities of 10-state automata. This combinatorial explosion may explain the reason that reputation has mostly been taken as a binary or trinary variable in the literature of indirect reciprocity (Tanabe et al., 2013) .
However, the similarity between states and reputations does not mean that our state-based representation can immediately serve as a social norm in the context of indirect reciprocity. The reason is that reputation is an external state: It is usually understood as public information shared coherently by all members of the society. It contrasts with the fact that any disagreement among states in this work remains unobservable because they are internal. This additional requirement of coherence imposes strong restrictions on the possible form of interplay between actions and states in a game of indirect reciprocity. Designing a successful social norm for indirect reciprocity thus still remains as a challenging question.
